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Abstract 
By applying the concept of “information ratio” to data published in The 2014 Berkshire Hathaway’s Annual Report, this 
work discuss with quantitative data and equations Warren Buffett’s management strategy and financial accomplishment at 
Berkshire Hathaway. Furthermore, a combined analysis of two time series (information ratio and GDP growth in the United 
States) assesses if the GDP growth had an impact upon Berkshire’s financial performance. Last but not least, this work 
argues that there is an underlying link between thoroughly investing and simply betting, shedding light on the difference 
between a ‘financial bet’ and a ‘managerial wager’.    
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1. The context of this work 
Warren Buffett is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Berkshire Hathaway. Its ‘Annual Report’ 
includes the section ‘Chairman’s Letter’ in which Buffett offers “a ruthlessly honest view of the company he 
runs”, as well as providing “an unfailingly intelligent explanation of the broader principles of investing, 
stripped bare of mumbo-jumbo”, according to The Economist [18], being manifestly “among the most 
influential documents in business”. Despite such acknowledgement, The Economist [18] did point out that the 
edition of the 2014 Chairman’s Letter “offers little analysis on how much of Berkshire’s success is due to Mr 
Buffett rather than its business model”. Moreover, The Economist [18] did advert to a material standpoint 
change in the ‘2014 Chairman’s Letter’: “Mr Buffett used to argue that Berkshire’s book value per share, 
rather than its share price, was a good proxy for its long-term worth. But the group’s book value has stopped 
outperforming the broader stock-market – in fact it has underperformed it in five of the past six years [the 
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newspaper published a chart as evidence]. So now Mr Buffett has begun to argue that book value is no longer 
such a good measure, and to give greater prominence to Berkshire’s share price. This sort of goalpost-moving 
is a habit of lesser conglomerates than Berkshire, and is hardly a promising sign”.   
There was another change, precisely in the ‘Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500’ table 
published immediately before the ‘Chairman’s Letter’ in The 2014 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report [1]. 
Unlike the table structure published each year until the ‘2013 Annual Report’ [2], the corresponding table in the 
2014 Annual Report introduced an additional column (“Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value 
of Berkshire”) but a column was suppressed (“Relative Results” with the difference for each year between two 
annual percentage changes: “per share book value of Berkshire” and “S&P 500 with Dividends included”). 
Nobody should complain or even notice that more information was disclosed, besides being still possible to 
compute the ‘relative results’. Nevertheless, the supplied additional data may shed light on how to quantify an 
investment performance, noting that Berkshire still considered that the “S&P 500 with Dividends included” is 
an appropriate benchmark to be used when evaluating portfolio performance.    
The use of the “S&P 500” as a suitable benchmark was also employed by Warren Buffett (not Berkshire) in 
the so-called “Million-Dollar Bet” with Protégé Partners, LLC (betting as a firm) that: “Over a ten-year period 
commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31, 2017, the S&P 500 will outperform a portfolio 
of funds of hedge funds, when performance is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses” [14]. Not 
only Buffett agreed with such statement, but he also registered in that moment the following suggestion: 
“Investors, on average and over time, will do better with a low-cost index fund than with a group of funds of 
funds” [14]. As a first comment on this bet, also reported by Loomis [15], as a senior editor at Fortune, Buffett 
seemingly considered that the holding company Berkshire Hathaway would neither be endangered by hedge 
funds (offering active investment strategies) nor be threatened by low-cost index funds (a passive investment). 
Consequently, an analysis of Warren Buffett’s personal bet or investment strategy should be detached from an 
assessment of the performance of the holding company Berkshire Hathaway.  
2. Theoretical Framework: the information ratio and the fundamental law of active management 
In tandem with the financial expectation: ‘higher risk, higher return’, when analyzing the performance of an 
investment manager, both sources of returns and sources of risk must be scrutinized together. Furthermore, 
measures of both return and risk should focus their relationship with the evolution of a selected benchmark, 
which is, hence, employed as a known, observed and accepted reference standard in relation to which 
investment objectives are quantitatively stated, continuously evaluated and regularly reported.  
Accordingly, the goal of quantifying a risk-adjusted performance for a certain period, taking into account the 
evolution of a selected benchmark, requires to link the ‘active return’ with the ‘active risk’. While the ‘active 
return’ (α) is defined as the return on a portfolio less the return on the portfolio’s benchmark, the ‘active risk’ 
(σ) - also known as ‘tracking risk’ or ‘tracking error’ - is the sample standard deviation of a string of active 
returns. When benchmark timing may be neglected, then ‘active return’ equals ‘residual return’ and ‘active 
risk’ equals ‘residual risk’. Both active return and active risk must be stated on the same time basis. Given a 
time series of active returns, it is possible to calculate the ‘mean active return’ and the correspondent ‘active 
risk’. Dividing the former by the latter, as shown by equation (1), leads to the ‘information ratio’ (IR): 
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Fabozzi [10] expounded that “the information ratio is essentially a reward-to-risk ratio. The reward is the 
average of the active return, that is, alpha. The risk is the standard deviation of the active return, the tracking 
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error, and, more specifically, backward-looking tracking error. The higher the information ratio, the better the 
manager performed relative to the risk assumed”.  Actually, equation (1) may be either calculated with 
historical data, resulting in the ‘ex-post information ratio’, or estimated with expected data, resulting in the ‘ex-
ante information ratio’. Whereas the ‘ex-ante information ratio’ is a measure of opportunity, Grinold and Kahn 
[12] explained that an ‘ex post information ratio’ is a measure of achievement, which is the focus of this paper. 
Although not calculating the ‘ex-post information ratio’, Fabozzi [10] gave an example on how the active risk 
(or ‘tracking error’) could be determined from portfolio returns and the corresponding benchmark index returns 
for a sequence of consecutive months.  
A similar procedure was applied in this work to calculate the mean active return, the active risk and the 
ex-post information ratio. Using the data in the table ‘Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500’ published by 
Berkshire Hathaway [1] and accepting Berkshire’s choice of the S&P 500 as the benchmark portfolio, there are 
now two possible ways of computing Berkshire’s active return for each year: subtracting the ‘annual 
percentage change of the S&P 500 with dividends included’ from either ‘the annual percentage change book 
value per-share’, or ‘the annual percentage change market value per-share’. Tax rates levied on returns, 
transaction costs, and fees may affect results. As a matter of fact, a habitual footnote to the table ‘Corporate 
Performance vs. the S&P 500’ in Berkshire’s annual reports commented the impact of taxes upon the analysis 
of the ‘relative returns’ for each year, without hampering any interpretation of such ‘active returns’ nonetheless. 
The next step requires selecting a number of years to calculate the information ratio. This choice may take 
into account Buffett’s comment [8]: “We feel noble intentions should be checked periodically against results. 
We test the wisdom of retaining earnings by assessing whether retention, over time, delivers shareholders at 
least $1 of market value for each $1 retained. To date, this test has been met. We will continue to apply it on a 
five-year rolling basis”. A ‘five-year rolling basis’ implies in calculating a moving average (‘mean active 
return’) and a corresponding sample standard deviation for the same rolling period (‘active risk’). These time 
series have 46 numbers each. Applying equation (1) to each 5-year period, a 5-year-rolling-data for the 
information ratio was found. Even though the size of the sample to compute each information ratio on a rolling 
basis seems to be small, the time-series with 46 numbers is sufficiently long so as to detect trends and infer 
performance until each yearend. Furthermore, there are two different sequences of the 5-year-rolling-data for 
the information ratio, once there is raw data related to ‘book value per share’ and ‘market value per share’. 
These two time series are plotted in Fig. 1 in section 3. 
Besides equation (1), the information ratio may also be approximately obtained by “a simple and 
surprisingly general formula called the fundamental law of active management” developed by Grinold and 
Kahn [12]. The authors [12] explained that: “The law is based on two attributes of a strategy, breadth and skill. 
The breadth of a strategy is the number of independent investment decisions that are made each year, and the 
skill, represented by the information coefficient, measures the quality of those investment decisions. ... The law 
connects breadth and skill to the information ratio through the (approximately true) formula”, in which ‘IC’ is 
the information coefficient and ‘BR’ is the breadth: 
 BRICIR u   (2) 
Equation (2) gives the aggregate value of the information ratio (IR) for a portfolio. Once a portfolio may be 
decomposed into several asset classes and the corresponding securities or even interest in non-publicly traded 
businesses, an information ratio may be specified for different investment managers in charge of each portfolio 
component. Each single value contributes to the overall information ratio, according to the additivity principle 
of ‘the fundamental law of active management’ ([12]) given by the equation (3) for a portfolio with “k” 
different asset classes or components, taking into account the assumption warned by Grinold and Kahn [12] of 
“optimal implementation of the alphas” across the combined set of assets:  
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3. Results and Discussions 
3.1. On Berkshire Hathaway’s information ratio 
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the two time series. The correlation coefficient between them is 0,73. 
Although this number is positive, it is not 1,0, as theoretically it should be in an ‘ideal world’, where the book 
value annual percentage change would precisely follow the market value annual percentage change, under 
perfect capital market assumptions, i.e. no taxes, no transaction costs, perfect corporate governance, no 
irrationality and no asymmetric information among all investors. With such setting, an analysis with per-share 
book value of Berkshire and per-share market value of Berkshire would supply the same information. 
Interestingly, the initiative to supply in February 2015 additional data (“Annual Percentage Change in Per-
Share Market Value of Berkshire”) occurred when the information ratio obtained from book value data was 
negative, whereas the information ratio obtained from market data was positive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The 5-year-rolling-data of the information ratio at Berkshire Hathaway 
Right at the beginning of the ‘2014 Chairman’s Letter’, Buffett [1] explained: “During our tenure, we have 
consistently compared the yearly performance of the S&P 500 to the change in Berkshire’s per-share book 
value. We’ve done that because book value has been a crude, but useful, tracking device for the number that 
really counts: intrinsic business value. In our early decades, the relationship between book value and intrinsic 
value was much closer than it is now. That was true because Berkshire’s assets were then largely securities 
whose values were continuously restated to reflect their current market prices. In Wall Street parlance, most of 
the assets involved in the calculation of book value were “marked to market”. Today, our emphasis has shifted 
in a major way to owning and operating large businesses. Many of these are worth far more than their cost-
based carrying value. But that amount is never revalued upward no matter how much the value of these 
companies has increased. Consequently, the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has 
materially widened”.  
Such avowal implies that any analysis after 2014 should eventually prefer to employ ‘market value per share 
data’, although even Buffett still recognized that: “Monthly or yearly movements of stocks are often erratic and 
not indicative of changes in intrinsic value” [1]. Moreover, any analysis should bear in mind what Buffett 
wrote in The 2010 Chairman’s Letter [3]: “The challenge, of course, is the calculation of intrinsic value. 
Present that task to Charlie and me separately, and you will get two different answers. Precision just isn’t 
possible. To eliminate subjectivity, we therefore use an understated proxy for intrinsic-value – book value – 
when measuring our performance. To be sure, some of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying 
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value on our books. … But since that premium seldom swings wildly from year to year, book value can serve as 
a reasonable device for tracking how we are doing”. 
In the same document, i.e. the ‘2010 Chairman’s Letter’ [3], Buffett predicted that “The bountiful years, we 
want to emphasize, will never return” adding that: “... our best years ended in the early 1980s. The market’s 
golden period, however, came in the 17 following years, with Berkshire achieving stellar absolute returns even 
as our relative advantage narrowed. After 1999, the market stalled (or have you already noticed that?). 
Consequently, the satisfactory performance relative to the S&P that Berkshire has achieved since then has 
delivered only moderate absolute results”. Contrasting this statement with data in Fig. 1, Berkshire achieved 
the higher sequence for the 5-year-rolling-data information ratio from book value data between yearend 1985 
and yearend 1998. Incidentally in the year 1985, Berkshire sold its unprofitable textile business [1] and, in the 
‘1999 Annual Report’, Buffett [4] admitted honestly and wittily that “Even Inspector Clouseau could find last 
year’s guilty party: your Chairman”. Furthermore, the average 5-year-rolling-data information ratio from book 
value data for the period 1985 to 1998 is 2,18, which is almost twice the average of all 46 available figures (i.e., 
1,02). Such amazing performance derived basically from a much lower ‘active risk’ rather than a substantial 
higher 5-year-rolling-data for the ‘mean active return’. In other words, between 1980 and 1998, Berkshire was 
able to present more stable and higher ‘active returns’ altogether.  
These facts above may be considered as strong evidence that ‘rolling-data information ratio from book value 
per share data’ may indeed quantify better Berkshire’s performance, at the same time free from biased 
perception and irrationalities in the capital market. From yearend 2000 until yearend 2010, the average value 
for the 5-year-rolling-data information ratio from book value data was equal to 0,38. This number is slightly 
below the bracket of “reasonable values” for the information ratio, ranging from 0,5 (good) to exceptional (1,0) 
as suggested by Grinold and Kahn [12].  
A visual inspection of Fig. 1 may also induce the inkling that the time series is nonstationary and it seems to 
decay towards zero, which would imply that Berkshire’s information ratio might steadily become lower and 
even remain negative. Such inference may illustrate the following account from Bernstein [6]: “The track 
records of professional investment managers are also subject to regression to the mean. ... Often investment 
managers lose ground simply because no one style of management stays in fashion forever”.  
 
Fig. 2. Information ratio and GDP change (source for GDP data [9]) 
Buffett’s outlook for the “next 50 years at Berkshire” is nonetheless optimistic, as inserted in the 2014 
Annual Report: “In some years the gains will be substantial, and at other times they will be minor. Markets, 
competition, and chance will determine when opportunities come our way. Through it all, Berkshire will keep 
moving forward, powered by the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new companies we will 
purchase. In most years, moreover, our country’s economy will provide a strong tailwind for business. We are 
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blessed to have the United States as our home field” [1]. Such resolute and passionate belief in the US business 
environment contributing for Berkshire’s success may be investigated with the data in Fig. 2.  
The 5-year-rolling-data of the information ratio at Berkshire Hathaway from book value per share data is 
plotted together with the annualized GDP change in the previous 5 years based on chained 2009 dollars [9]. 
The correlation coefficient between the two time series plotted in Fig. 2 is only 0,29. Apparently, an US GDP 
growth trend did not trigger a corresponding growth of the information ratio in the most recent years. During 
Berkshire’s best period in the 1980s and 1990s, the correlation coefficient between the two time series with 
data between yearend 1985 and yearend 1998 was -0,44. Such negative value might not be surprising, because 
Berkshire’s seems to apply a ‘bottom-up approach’ when investing, which means that the business valuation is 
much more important than the assessment of the business environment, as it will be debated further.  
3.2. Gambling and investing 
Seven years later from inception of the “Million-Dollar Bet”, Loomis [16] reported that the year 2014 “was 
the sixth straight year that the contest has tilted in Buffett’s direction ... Only in the first year of the bet—which 
began in 2008, a year that was a train wreck for both the economy and the stock market—did the funds of funds 
win, so to speak. They were down, on average, only 24%”. In addition to assert that Buffett was better-off, such 
statement actually confirmed Buffett’s challenger published argument in 2008 [14] that: “For hedge funds, 
success can mean outperforming the market in lean times, while underperforming in the best of times”.  
It’s beyond the scope of this paper to introduce other details on “Million-Dollar Bet”, or to debate why 
Buffett’s challenger undoubtedly lagged the S&P500 in the last 6 years, and even less to forecast who will 
ultimately win. If minutes or even milliseconds may surprisingly turn around the outcome of a sport 
competition, would three years be too short to change the current status of Buffett in the “Million-Dollar Bet”? 
Once reputable financial practitioners accepted to enter into a long-term bet with a very high pecuniary and 
reputational stake, it is worthwhile analyzing if financial decisions may actually be detached from gambling. 
Paul Wilmott [20] inserted a stand-alone chapter on “investment lessons from blackjack and gambling” in 
his book on “Quantitative Finance” with the aim “to gain as much insight as possible from the world of 
gambling before embarking on the more ‘sophisticated’ mathematics of portfolio management”. According to 
Wilmott [20], “since the rules are simple and the probabilities can be analyzed, blackjack is also the perfect 
game to learn about risk and return, and money management and, perhaps most importantly, to help you learn 
what type of gambler you are. Are you risk averse or a risk seeker? An important question for anyone who later 
will work in banking and may be gambling with OPM, other people’s money”. Such ‘important question’ as a 
matter of fact is related to an emotional response, which Graham [11] also considered to be relevant by 
investing: “The kind of securities to be purchased and the rate of return to be sought depend not on the 
investor's financial resources but on his financial equipment in terms of knowledge, experience, and 
temperament”. In the preface to that Graham’s book [11], Buffett wrote: “to invest successfully over a lifetime 
does not require a stratospheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What’s needed is a sound 
intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework”.  
Another type of gamble in a casino was applied by Grinold and Kahn [12] to exemplify the ‘fundamental 
law of active management’ (equation (2)). The authors referred to a roulette game. Therefore, apart from 
making financial issues more pleasant or intimate, gambling situations may be evoked given the uncertainty to 
attribute probabilities to outcomes, to manage the consequences of the outcomes and, in fact, even to list in 
advance all possible outcomes, describing all the details of each one (What will happen? When will it happen? 
Where will it happen? Why will it happen? Who will be affected? How it will happen?). At least to some extent, 
a bet might always be inevitable, yet a ‘financial bet’ fairly obviously occurs when speculating on the uncertain 
outcome of short-term transactions with financial assets (such as day-trading with securities). 
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Besides the “Million-Dollar Bet”, Warren Buffett almost certainly engaged in other bets with higher stakes. 
In his 2013 letter to Berkshire’s shareholders, Buffett [2] wrote: “Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great 
Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the 
transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.” That kind of commitment was 
nothing new for us: We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of 
Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. 
prosperity to be very close to a sure thing”. That “bet” should not be leveled with a ‘financial bet’ nonetheless. 
3.3. On Berkshire Hathaway’s managerial wager 
The information ratio data in Fig. 1 may indeed raise doubts on whether Berkshire’s success will eventually 
endure. This suspicion increases with the apparent belief that much of Berkshire’s success is dependent on 
Buffett rather than Berkshire’s business model, which in turn may be relying on Berkshire’s huge and growing 
insurance operation. Buffett [1] reported that Berkshire’s “huge and growing insurance operation again 
operated at an underwriting profit in 2014 – that makes 12 years in a row – and increased its float. During that 
12-year stretch, our float – money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit – has 
grown from $41 billion to $84 billion. Though neither that gain nor the size of our float is reflected in 
Berkshire’s earnings, float generates significant investment income because of the assets it allows us to hold”. 
Consequently, a relevant challenge to Berkshire is to find “sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash”, as 
Buffett [2] acknowledged after explaining another relevant trait of Berkshire’s business model: “our flexibility 
in capital allocation – our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses – gives us a 
significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate”. Last but not least, 
an “acquisition criteria” section, basically with the same words, eventually updating numbers, may be found in 
each annual report at least since the 1995. In that year [5] and in the recent ‘2014 Annual Report’ [1] it was 
written: “We are eager to hear from principals or their representatives about businesses that meet all of the 
following criteria: [six topics are listed]”, expressing Berkshire’s eager search for appropriate investment 
opportunities, where business valuation plays a preponderant role compared to the assessment of the business 
environment, being crucial to seize additional profitable opportunities. This may be a great challenge, once 
Buffett [8] wrote: “As our net worth grows, it is more difficult to use retained earnings wisely” and Graham [11] 
indicated: “smaller size [of funds] is a necessary factor for obtaining continued outstanding results”. 
A propitious outcome of Berkshire’s business model is not necessarily dependent on Buffett’s either 
financial knowledge or effort, but his managerial skills may be decisive for Berkshire to embrace opportunities 
and to overcome threats. For example, the British newspaper The Economist [19] reported that “data and 
technology are starting to up-end the insurance business”. After illustrating this statement with real cases, the 
conclusion was: “if any group ought to be worried by these changes to insurance, it is not the customers. 
Underwriters claim theirs is a unique skill that cannot be easily copied. But any decent health monitor would 
be flashing frantic warnings by this stage”. Buffett [2] admitted that insurance is “Berkshire’s core operation 
and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published”. Probably 
Berkshire is already aware that the remarkable success of their core operation, which currently contributes with 
‘a 12-year profits in a row’, ‘an increasing float’ and ‘a gusher of cash’ may come to an end, because the size 
of the insurance business within the corporation has reduced with time and because Buffett has learned from 
life that there is no point in maintaining a dying business, even when the textile operation that was finally 
closed in 1985 was actually the source of the name of its parent corporation: Berkshire Hathaway [1]. 
Furthermore, Fig. 1 clearly shows that Berkshire’s information ratio soared in 1985, incidentally in the year of 
the end of that textile operation, which was actually the reason of Berkshire’s existence.  
Buffett’s reaction to the significant fall of Berkshire’s performance in 1999, also evidenced with Fig. 1, may 
illustrate his willingness to overcome threats constructively. Instead of blaming circumstances or persons for a 
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failure, Buffett [4] wrote straightforwardly in the ‘1999 Annual Report’: “My “one subject” is capital 
allocation, and my grade for 1999 most assuredly is a D. What most hurt us during the year was the inferior 
performance of Berkshire’s equity portfolio — and responsibility for that portfolio, leaving aside the small 
piece of it run by Lou Simpson of GEICO, is entirely mine. Several of our largest investees badly lagged the 
market in 1999 because they’ve had disappointing operating results. We still like these businesses and are 
content to have major investments in them. But their stumbles damaged our performance last year, and it’s no 
sure thing that they will quickly regain their stride”. Such candid statement may actually highlight the actual 
role of Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway. 
According to Grinold and Kahn [12], the ‘fundamental law of active management’ “encourages managers to 
have an eclectic style. If a manager can find some independent source of information that will be of use, then 
he should exploit that information. ... At the same time, the sponsor who hires a stable of managers has an 
incentive to diversify their styles in order to insure that their bets are independent”. The equation (2) allows of 
the doubling of the current value of the information ratio (IR), when the measure of skill (IC) duplicates, the 
number of independent forecasts of exceptional returns (BR) quadruplicates, or a combined increase of both IC 
and BR will twofold the IR. Thus, to raise the information ratio, an increase in skill may be more effective than 
an increase in breath, although it might be harder to be more skilled than to forecast more. 
An erroneous inference on Berkshire’s strategy may emerge by quickly applying equation (2) after a haste 
reading of a paragraph of the ‘Chairman’s Letter’ in 1993, in which Buffett [7] wrote: “Charlie and I decided 
long ago that in an investment lifetime it's just too hard to make hundreds of smart decisions. That judgment 
became ever more compelling as Berkshire's capital mushroomed and the universe of investments that could 
significantly affect our results shrank dramatically. Therefore, we adopted a strategy that required our being 
smart - and not too smart at that - only a very few times. Indeed, we'll now settle for one good idea a year”. A 
misleading interpretation would hint that Berkshire’s breath would be only 1,0. Consequently, the information 
ratio as given by equation (2) would completely reflect Berkshire’s investment skill and vice versa. 
However, the previously discussed concept embedded in the additivity principle given by equation (3) may 
actually apply better to disclose concisely Berkshire’s investment strategy for the “next 50 years at Berkshire” 
in which, according to Buffett [1], investments “will be handled by several specialists”, plausibly with different 
skills, styles, including levels of risk aversion, besides the fact that Berkshire’s “investment managers will 
enjoy great autonomy”, which contributes to foster more independent forecasts. In the same paragraph and 
acting as a sponsor, Buffett informed that the specialized investment managers “will report to the CEO because 
their investment decisions, in a broad way, will need to be coordinated with Berkshire’s operating and 
acquisition programs”.  
Thus, it should be accurate to state that Berkshire’s chairman Warren Buffett attempts to hire a diversified 
stable of skilled investment managers, each one expected to deliver a high ‘information coefficient’ (IC) related 
to a strategy breath or ‘independent forecasts of excess returns’ (BR) in different businesses. A sponsor with 
such strategy strives to increase the corporate aggregate information ratio (IR), following equation (3). When 
buying a business and hiring its managers, there is, in truth, a ‘managerial wager’. Buffett’s long-time partner 
at Berkshire, Charlie Munger, apparently is also endorsing such approach, considering his statement quoted by 
Lowe [17] in Munger’s biography: “The game of investing is one of making better predictions about the future 
than other people. How are you going to do that? One way is to limit your tries to areas of competence. If you 
try to predict the future of everything, you attempt too much. You’re going to fail through lack of 
specialization”. Successful holding companies may precisely rely on obtaining forecasts from specialized 
managers acting in several ‘areas of competences’ or different businesses.  
Occasionally the results delivered by several managers may stumble altogether, such as experienced and 
reported by Buffett in 1999 (as above mentioned), jeopardizing the aggregate information ratio, but Buffett 
must wontedly assure that the resulting mixture of earnings performance is tempting. Evoking Grinold and 
Kahn’s analogy [12]: “the managers prepare the distinct ingredients and the sponsor makes the stew”.   
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Given the subtle difference in approach between ‘financial bet’ and ‘managerial wager’, the term 
‘diversification’ should hence be subdivided too. Buffett at Berkshire apparently carries out a ‘managerial 
diversification’ rather than a ‘financial diversification’ as recommended by the so-called ‘modern portfolio 
theory’. He even ‘dared’ to criticize modern portfolio theory and diversification, when Buffett [7] wrote: “The 
strategy we've adopted precludes our following standard diversification dogma. Many pundits would therefore 
say the strategy must be riskier than that employed by more conventional investors. We disagree. We believe 
that a policy of portfolio concentration may well decrease risk if it raises, as it should, both the intensity with 
which an investor thinks about a business and the comfort-level he must feel with its economic characteristics 
before buying into it. In stating this opinion, we define risk, using dictionary terms, as "the possibility of loss or 
injury”. Buffett’s view of risk as a threat clashes the classical financial definition of risk, which associates risk 
to volatility and quantifies risk with the standard deviation of returns. Therefore, those with a financial portfolio 
mindset might actually bet in asset classes and securities according to their degree of risk aversion, to the level 
of volatility and to the current portfolio composition, while who has a similar managerial business approach as 
Buffett might wager according to the belief that each investee (either an associate or a controlled business) 
might have an enduring competitive advantage, regardless of its weight on the portfolio or even its trading price 
as long as its underlying value is expected to increase year after year, what is essentially a ‘managerial wager’. 
The above inference on Berkshire’s strategy should explain why an ordinary individual would not be able to 
invest as the institutional investor Berkshire Hathaway is able to. Actually, Buffett [2] indicated a passive 
investment strategy to all non-professional investors: “The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick 
winners – neither he nor his “helpers” can do that – but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses 
that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal”. Buffett 
supplemented the advice by suggesting “to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the 
news is bad and stocks are well off their highs”. Both propositions are indeed also very adequately addressed to 
Berkshire’s shareholders, if they remain confident that Berkshire shares will outperform the S&P500 over the 
years. The ‘Chairman’s Letter’ may be deemed to be part of the strategy to promote Berkshire’s capabilities. 
Berkshire’s aggregately investment skill and performance may indeed rely rather on Warren Buffett’s 
outstanding ‘managerial skills and wagers’ when hiring managers, engineering business deals, and 
communicating both results and outlooks than on his acute and famous ‘financial insights and bets’ as an 
investment practitioner, which led him to be called the ‘Wizard of Omaha, ‘Oracle of Omaha’ or ‘Sage of 
Omaha’. No wonder that the succession plan at Berkshire might have to be obscure.  
Last but not least, although a normal person does not have either the resources or access to the investment 
environment available and receptive to Berkshire Hathaway chaired by Buffett, he might ultimately be 
perceived as a hero by ordinary people. Such appreciation may help non-professional investors to deal better 
with their financial issues, regardless of being Berkshire’s shareholders, as Kiyosaki [13] explained: “Copying 
or emulating heroes is true power learning. ... I follow what Warren Buffett invests in, and read anything I can 
about his point of view on the market. ... But heroes do more than simply inspire us. Heroes make things look 
easy. It’s the making it look easy that convinces us to want to be just like them. ‘If they can do it, so can I’. 
When it comes to investing, too many people make it sound hard. Instead find heroes who make it look easy”.  
4. Conclusions and Final Comments 
Warren Buffett would probably refute the ‘ex-post information ratio’ (equation (1)) as a measure of 
achievement, since he despised in the ‘1993 Chairman’s Letter’ the concept of ‘financial risk’, which is 
embedded in the information ratio. Still, the 5-year-rolling-data sequence of the information ratio for Berkshire 
Hathaway depicted in Fig. 1 quite accurately represented Berkshire’s financial performance. Moreover, the 
‘fundamental law of active management’ (equation (2)) and its additivity principle (equation (3)) may unveil 
quite neatly Berkshire’s investment approach, which seemingly did not rely on the US GDP growth (Fig. 2). 
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As suggested in this work, although the terms ‘bet’ and ‘wager’ are synonyms, ‘financial bet’ was pictured 
as directly speculating on uncertain outcomes of transactions with financial assets by entering into long or short 
positions, whereas ‘managerial wager’ was related to leading a stable of investment managers and wagering in 
their specialized skills and independent abilities to run on-going businesses so as to both forecast and deliver 
suitable financial returns (i.e., basically with ‘long positions’). Thus, ‘financial diversification’, as laid out by 
the so-called ‘modern portfolio theory’, has a slightly different approach than ‘managerial diversification’. This 
avenue seems to be the strategy at Berkshire, whose chairman, Warren Buffett, strive to accomplish 
outstanding ‘managerial wagers’ with acquisitions and management leadership, which both raised Berkshire’s 
equity and, according to the ‘additive principle’ of the ‘fundamental law of active management’, maintained 
Berkshire’s information ratio at persistent high levels (particularly in the 1980s and 90s). The above-suggested 
terminology may further the insight on both portfolio management and decision making in Finance. 
Warren Buffett should be recognized not only for sharing knowledge and insights, but also for being able to 
supply outstanding, consistent returns to Berkshire Hathaway’s shareholders. Berkshire’s apparently faltering 
financial performance in the last years may actually illustrate the ‘mean reversion’ principle, which might not 
be deterred, according to Bernstein [6]: “If the winners kept on winning and the losers kept on losing, our 
economy would consist of a shrinking handful of giant monopolies and virtually no small companies at all”. 
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